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THE CONTROVERSY OVER whether rapid population growth in the countries 
of the South or high consumption in those of the North is to be held respon-
sible for global environmental problems is usually framed in terms of the 
I= PAT identity first introduced by Ehrlich and Holdren ( 197 l }. In a typi-
cal formulation, environmental impact (I} is seen as the product of three 
factors: population (P}; affluence (A}, which is measured by gross national 
product per person; and technological efficiency (T}, which is expressed as 
impact per unit of GNP. This identity is useful and suggestive as a first 
approach, because it demonstrates that environmental impact is due, not 
to one factor alone, but to a combination of factors. However, I = PAT has 
serious limitations if taken as a basis for more rigorous scientific analysis. 
The problems with I= PAT can be grouped into two broad categories: 
( l) the omission of interactions between the variables, and (2) questions 
related to the choice of variables: 
(l) I= PAT cannot contribute much to resolving the population ver-
sus consumption debate because of differences of opinion concerning the 
interactions between the factors P, A, and T. The Malthusian view argues 
that population growth diminishes affluence and thereby impedes techni-
cal progress; the Boserupian view argues that population growth enhances 
technology and thereby increases affluence; and the modernization argu-
ment stresses that increasing affluence slows the rate of population growth 
and enhances technical progress, thus reducing impact per unit of GNP. 
Analysis along I = PAT lines cannot resolve these differences of opinion, 
because the controversial relationships are not explicit in the equation. 1 
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(2) In some decomposition exercises, such as the decomposition of 
trends in the crude birth rate into age-structure and fertility-rate effects, 
the choice of variables is a straightforward matter of accounting. In the 
case of I = PAT the choice is much less self-evident. If the impact to be 
studied is, say, C02 emissions, why should the emitting unit be taken as 
the individual rather than, say, the household or the community? In other 
words, the choice of factors requires substantive justification and should 
not be taken for granted. 
The following note concerns itself with the second (and less serious) 
problem, specifically, with the accounting implications of the fact that I = 
PAT selects the individual as the demographic unit. We illustrate the con-
sequences of considering households (H) instead of individuals as the con-
suming unit (i.e., I= HAT instead of I= PAT). The substantive justification 
for this lies in the fact that for many goods, such as automobile transport 
and residential energy consumption, there are significant economies of scale: 
for example, a household of four persons will consume far less than twice 
as much as a household consisting of two persons.2 For goods whose con-
sumption is tied more closely to the hearth than to the individual, the size 
and rate of growth of population are of less concern than the number and 
rate of growth of households. 
In the next section, we compare trends in the rate of growth of house-
holds to trends in the rate of growth of population and discuss the roles of 
changing age-specific household headship rates and changing population 
age structures. We then present an illustrative calculation in which growth 
of world primary energy demand from 1970 to 1990 is decomposed using 
the I= PAT and I= HAT identities. Because of the rapid growth over this 
period in the number of households in more developed regions, the two 
identities yield very different allocations of responsibility between demo-
graphic and economic factors. We then use the I= PAT and I= HAT mod-
els to calculate substantially different illustrative projections of co2 emis-
sions from 1990 to 2100. The fundamental point of both exercises is that 
the decomposition approach contains an arbitrary element, depending as 
it does on the demographic unit of account. 
Average household size: Historical trends 
and outlook 
Average household size is the inverse of the average household headship 
rate, which is defined as the number of persons in the population who are 
heads of households divided by the population, expressed as a rate. Age-
specific household headship rates are defined by the number of heads of 
households in a certain age group divided by the total number of persons 
in that age group. Changes in average household size result from the com-
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bined evolution of age-specific household headship rates and the age struc-
ture of the population. 
Between 1950 and 1990, average household size in all of the more 
developed regions underwent a decline that, in proportional terms, can 
fairly be termed massive: on average, from 3.6 to 2 .7 (see Table 1 and the 
Statistical Note for definition of regions and a description of estimation pro-
cedures). This decline was due more-or-less equally to changes in popula-
tion age structure (mostly aging) and to increases in age-specific house-
hold headship rates; the former is an accounting effect while the latter 
reflects actual changes in behavior. Among these changes were young per-
sons' moving away from home earlier, declining age-specific nuptiality rates 
(with a consequent increase in the mean age at marriage), and the grow-
ing tendency of the aged to live on their own rather than with their children. 
The less developed regions, by contrast, present a mixed picture. Av-
erage household size declined in China and Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, 
and South America, while it increased in all other regions. For all less de-
veloped regions combined, household size remained practically unchanged, 
declining only from 5.0 in 1950 to 4.8 in 1990. In fact, if China is excluded, 
average household size in the less developed regions increased significantly.3 
The increase was most pronounced in South Asia and North Africa, where 
increases in average household size from 5.0 to 5. 7 can be attributed, en-
tirely in the first case and largely in the second, to reductions in age-spe-
cific headship rates. Of the three regions that experienced declines in aver-
age household size, only in the statistically uncertain case of China can the 
decline be attributed to an increase in age-specific household headship rates. 
Further information can be gained by comparing changes in 1950-70 
with changes in 1970-90 (see Table 1). During the first 20 years, in more 
developed regions, increases in age-specific household headship rates were 
a more important source of change than was shifting age structure. The 
situation was reversed during the last 20 years: the aging of populations 
drove changes in household size, and increases in age-specific household 
headship rates were relatively unimportant. In less developed regions, a 
similar reversal is observed. In 1950-70, the trend in age-specific house-
hold headship rates favored decline in average household size, but age-
structure effects (i.e., the younger population age structure associated with 
mortality decline and unchanged fertility levels) were stronger in the op-
posite direction, resulting in an overall increase in average household size. 
In 1970-90, by contrast, fertility decline started to work its way through 
the age structure in most less developed countries, leading to an increase 
in the share of young adults in the population and consequent decline in 
average household size. 
What does the future hold? Research on the decline of the extended 
family in more developed countries has identified three basic themes, one 
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TABLE l Average household size, world regions, 1950, 1970, and 
1990 
1950 1970 1990 
North Africa 5.0 5.3 5.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 4 .9 5.1 
Northern America 3.5 3.1 2.6 
Central America 4 .6 4 .9 4.9 
South America 5.0 5.0 4.4 
West and Central Asia 5.0 5.3 5.1 
South Asia 5.0 5.6 5.7 
China and Hong Kong 5.0 4.7 4.1 
Southeast Asia 5.2 5.3 4 .8 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 4.7 3.6 3.0 
East Europe 3.7 3.3 2.9 
West Europe 3.5 3.1 2.6 
World 4.5 4.4 4.1 
More developed regions 3.6 3.2 2.7 
Less developed regions 5.0 5.1 4 .8 
Change due to 
Age-specific 
Age distribution headship rates 
1950-70 1970-90 1950-70 1970-90 
North Africa 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 .1 
Northern America 0.2 --0.5 --0.6 0.0 
Central America 0.5 --0 .6 --0.2 0.6 
South America 0.1 --0.6 --0 . l 0 .0 
West and Central Asia 0.2 --0 .3 0.1 0.1 
South Asia 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.3 
China and Hong Kong 0.7 --0.9 -1.0 0.3 
Southeast Asia 0.3 --0.6 --0.2 0.1 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand --0.7 --0.4 --0.4 --0.2 
East Europe --0.3 --0.4 --0.1 0.0 
West Europe --0. l --0.2 --0 .3 --0.3 
World 0 .2 --0 .3 --0 .3 0.0 
More developed regions --0.1 --0.4 --0 .3 --0. l 
Less developed regions 0.4 --0.4 --0 .3 0.1 
NOTE: See the Statistical Note for definition of more developed and less developed region aggregates. Totals 
in this and the following tables may not add due to rounding. 
demographic, one sociological, and one economic. 4 The demographic view 
emphasizes that residence in an extended household unit must necessarily 
decline along with fertility for the simple reason that there are fewer kin 
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(including siblings) to live with. The sociological view argues that there 
has been an exogenous shift in tastes toward privacy. The economic view 
concentrates on such factors as income and the price of housing. Bumpass 
( 1990) and others have synthesized the three views to argue convincingly 
that no end is in sight to the shift toward more atomized living arrange-
ments in more developed countries. The data in Table 1 indicate that in-
creases in age-specific household headship rates contributed only -0.1 to 
the change in average household size in more developed regions in 1970-
90, as opposed to -0.3 in 1950-70, so further behavioral change may have 
only modest impact. However, future declines in the proportion of the popu-
lation aged under 15 and increases in the proportion aged 60 and older 
suggest that, even barring future individuation, average household size will 
continue to decline. 
Research on household structure in less developed countries is lim-
ited by data availability. Foster ( 1993) finds that household structure in 
Bangladesh has been resistant to change, and cites consistent research re-
sults from elsewhere in South Asia. One might argue that the period cov-
ered by Foster (eight years) is insufficient for much change to occur and 
that Bangladesh is a stagnating economy. Reviewing 12 years of dynamic 
economic growth in Taiwan ( 1973-85), Weinstein et al. ( 1990) found that 
the proportion of couples living in nuclear households increased from 43 
percent to 56 percent, leading the authors to have it both ways: they note 
the "gradual erosion of norms" sanctioning coresidence, but at the same 
time emphasize that nearly half of Taiwanese couples in 1985 were still 
living in extended units. 
The traditional view, canonized by Goode ( 1963 ), is that the decline 
of the extended family is an inevitable accompaniment of what is indeli-
cately termed "modernization." This gives rise to a "stages of development" 
interpretation according to which average household size in third world 
countries will decline as countries attain a higher material standard of liv-
ing. One explanation might be that complex, extended household units 
are inherently less capable of allocating substantial resources harmoniously 
than are simple, nuclear ones. It might also be argued that with develop-
ment comes the emergence of institutions, such as social security systems, 
to provide the insurance against risk that was formerly provided by the 
extended family. On the other hand, "stages of development" models lack 
rigorous microlevel foundations and postulate a rigid relationship between 
per-person income and various social indexes. For example, Yi et al. ( 1994) 
found that the mean age of leaving the parental home was about three 
years higher for young adults in China, Japan, and South Korea than in 
the United States, France, and Sweden. Japan, of course, is not a develop-
ing country, a fact that gives rise to two possible interpretations: either 
cultural factors are as important as "stage of development," or rapid eco-
nomic development in Japan has not yet manifested itself in changing 
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household structure, but will do so eventually. Moreover, differences between 
the United States and the two European countries were fairly substantial. 
For purposes of forecasting average household size in the developing 
world, however, these issues are less important than might be thought. In 
fact, differences in age-specific household headship rates between more 
and less developed regions are significant only at the extremes of the age 
distribution; between ages 40 and 65, the age-specific rate schedules are 
practically indistinguishable. When 1990 age-specific household headship 
rates from less developed regions are applied to the 1990 population in 
more developed regions to calculate an age-standardized household 
headship rate, a striking fact emerges: the age-standardized rate in the less 
developed regions, 329 per thousand (average household size of 3.0) is 
only a little more than 10 percent lower than the age-standardized headship 
rate in the more developed regions, 366 per thousand (average household 
size of 2. 7). It would thus seem that future changes in population age struc-
ture in less developed countries will have a much greater impact on aver-
age household size than will changes in age-specific headship rates. In other 
words, compositional effects will be more important than the less certain 
(and more controversial) behavioral changes in family formation and liv-
ing arrangements that may arise in the context of "modernization." The 
age-structure changes that we have mentioned above in the case of more 
developed countries-a decline in the proportion at young ages, and an 
increase in the proportion who are elderly-will be more extreme for less 
developed countries because of the speed of fertility decline. Thus, even 
with no changes in age-specific headship rates, average household size in 
less developed countries will decline substantially. 
Table 2 presents the results of four projections of average household 
size. "Central," "Low" and "High" scenarios correspond to IIASA popula-
tion scenarios; 5 age-specific household headship rates are assumed to re-
main constant at 1990 levels, so differences in average household size be-
tween these variants are entirely due to differences in population age 
structure. The final variant, the "Modified Central" scenario, was calcu-
lated by applying the 1990 average age-specific headship rates in more de-
veloped regions to the Central scenario population projection for less de-
veloped regions; thus, differences between the Central and Modified Central 
scenarios apply only to less developed regions and are due entirely to dif-
ferences in age-specific headship rates.6 
Based on changes in the age structure alone, average household size 
in more developed regions is projected to decline modestly, from 2.7 to 2.5 
in the Central scenario. Only in the High scenario, which combines high 
fertility (implying a high proportion of the population under 15) and high 
mortality (implying a small proportion of the population aged 60 and older), 
does it increase, and this insignificantly, from its current 2.7 to 2.8. Aver-
age household size in less developed regions, by contrast, is projected un-
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TABLE 2 Average household size, 1990, and projected average 
household size in 2030 and 2100, according to four alternative 
scenarios, world regions 
Central Low High 
scenario scenario scenario 
1990 2030 2100 2030 2100 2030 2100 
North Africa 5.7 4.1 2.9 3.7 2.5 4.5 3.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.1 4.2 2.6 3.8 2.4 4.6 2.8 
Northern America 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.7 
Central America 4.9 3.3 2.6 3.1 2.2 3.6 2.9 
South America 4.4 3.3 2.8 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.1 
West and Central Asia 5.1 3.8 2 .8 3.5 2.4 4 .1 3.1 
South Asia 5.7 4.0 2.8 3.7 2.5 4.3 3.1 
China and Hong Kong 4 .1 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.5 3.3 3.1 
Southeast Asia 4 .8 3.3 2.7 3.1 2.4 3.6 2.9 
Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 
East Europe 2.9 2.6 2 .6 2.4 2.3 2.8 3.0 
West Europe 2.6 2.5 2 .5 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.8 
World 4 .1 3.5 2.7 3.2 2.4 3.8 3.0 
More developed regions 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.8 
Less developed regions 4.8 3.7 2.7 3.4 2 .4 4 .0 3.0 
NOTE: For description of the four scenarios see text . See also Note to Table I. 
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Modified 
Central 
scenario 
2030 2100 
3.6 2.6 
4 .3 2.7 
2.5 2.4 
3.1 2.4 
3.0 2.6 
3.3 2.5 
3.3 2.4 
2.7 2.4 
3.0 2.5 
2.9 3.0 
2.6 2.6 
2.5 2.5 
3.1 2.5 
2.6 2.5 
3.3 2.5 
der all three scenarios to undergo a decisive decline. Thus, age-structure 
changes alone are sufficient to ensure that, by the end of the next century, 
average household size in more developed and less developed regions will 
converge-to 2.5 and 2.7, respectively, in the Central scenario; 2.3 and 2.4 
in the Low scenario; and 2.8 and 3.0 in the High scenario. This conver-
gence mostly reflects declines in average household size in less developed 
regions. 
The effect of imposing average more-developed-region age-specific 
headship rates on less developed regions is significant in the medium term-
in 2030 the Modified Central scenario envisions an average household size 
of 3.3 in less developed regions, as opposed to 3. 7 in the Central scenario-
bu.t in the long term, the differences between the Central and Modified 
Central scenarios are small; it is age structure that drives the convergence 
process. 
Between 1950 and 1990, the population in less developed regions grew 
at an average rate of 2.2 percent per year and the number of households at 
2.3 percent per year; in more developed regions, the corresponding rates 
of growth were 0.9 percent and 1.6 percent per year. Thus, whereas the 
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"demographic growth gap" was 1.3 percentage points per year in terms of 
population, it was a much narrower 0.7 percentage point in terms of house-
holds. In the future, according to the projection results in Table 2, the gap 
will be broader, not narrower, for households than for population. In the 
Central scenario, population in more developed regions is projected to grow 
at an average rate of 0.3 percent per year between 1990 and 2100, and 
households at a roughly equal rate of 0.4 percent per year. In less devel-
oped regions, the corresponding growth rates are 0. 9 percent per year and 
1.4 percent per year, respectively. Thus the "demographic growth gap" of 
0.6 percentage point per year in terms of population is projected to be a 
considerably wider 1.0 percentage point per year in terms of households. 
If age-specific household headship rates decline in less developed regions, 
as in the Modified Central scenario, the differences will be more pro-
nounced. 
I = PAT or I = HAT? 
Despite its limitations, the I= PAT identity has become the model of choice 
in decomposing change in global environmental impacts into changes due 
to population growth and changes due to other factors. In this section, we 
illustrate differences that arise when the household, as opposed to the in-
dividual, is chosen as the demographic unit of account. 
Let 
P(t) = Population 
y(t) =Gross National Product (GNP) per person 
/(t) = Impact (natural resource use or pollution generated) 
a(t) = l(t)ly(t), impact per unit of GNP 
all at time t. Then 
I(t) = P(t) y(t) a(t) 
The I= PAT identity can be converted into an I= HAT-Impact-House-
holds-Affluence-Technology-identity simply by substituting households, 
H(t), for population and measuring affluence in terms of GNP per house-
hold, which we denote x(t): 
I(t) = H(t) x(t) a(t) 
Each of the two alternative identities is no more valid than the as-
sumption that underlies it: impacts are considered as arising from activities 
undertaken either at the level of the household or at the level of the indi-
vidual. 
We will take impact as one and the same thing as consumption, C(t), 
of a natural resource, on the understanding that generalization to cover 
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emission of a pollutant is straightforward. Using G to denote growth rates, 
in growth-rate form the I= PAT model is 
G=G+G+G 
c p y a 
and the I = HAT model is 
G, =GH+Gx+Ga. 
An example: Growth of energy consumption, 
197~90 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 display data on population and households, GNP, and 
primary commercial energy consumption that permit I= PAT and I= HAT 
decompositions of growth of world energy consumption in more devel-
oped and less developed regions over the period 1970-90; results are re-
ported in Table 6. Increases in energy consumption accounted for by rise 
in income and by change in technology (the ratio of energy to GNP) are 
considered together. This reflects the assumption, referred to by many re-
searchers (for example, MacKellar and Horlacher 1994; Preston 1994; Crop-
per and Griffiths 1994; World Bank 1992; Gilland 1986), that environmental 
impact per unit of GNP varies predictably with per-person (or per-house-
hold) income. The assumption that change in technology is accounted for 
TABLE 3 Population and households, world regions, 
1970 and 1990 
1970 1990 
Less developed regions 
Persons (millions) 2,695 4, 150 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 2.2 
Crude headship rate (per l 000) 196 207 
Households (millions) 529 861 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 2.5 
Persons per household 5.1 4.8 
More developed regions 
Persons (millions) 1,002 1, 145 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 0.7 
Crude headship rate (per 1000) 307 366 
Households (millions) 308 419 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 1.6 
Persons per household 3.2 2.7 
SOURCES: Population: Lutz ( 1994) ; number of households calculated on the basis of 
household headship rate estimates discussed in text. 
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TABLE 4 Gross national product, world regions, 1970 
and 1990 
Less developed regions 
Total (billions 1991 US$) 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 
Per person ( 199 l US$) 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 
Per household ( 199 l US$) 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 
More developed regions 
Total (billions 1991 US$) 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 
Per person ( 199 l US$) 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 
Per household ( 199 l US$) 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 
1970 
l.343 
498 
2,539 
l 0, 115 
10,095 
32,840 
1990 
3,735 
5.2 
900 
3.0 
4,338 
2.7 
17, 175 
2.7 
15,000 
2.0 
40,990 
l.l 
SOURCES: Per·person GNP and growth rate of per·person GNP 1970-90 estimated by 
authors from United Nations Development Programme ( 1994) : Tables 2 and 27. Total GNP 
and per-household GNP calculated based on data in Table 3. 
TABLE 5 Primary commercial energy consumption, 
world regions, 1970 and 1990 
1970 1990 
Less developed regions 
Total (million tons oil equivalent) 624 2,283 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 6.7 
Per-person (kg oil equivalent) 232 550 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 4.4 
Per-household (kg oil equivalent) l,l 79 2,651 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 4.1 
More developed regions 
Total (million tons oil equivalent) 3,778 5,725 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 2 .1 
Per-person (kg oil equivalent) 3,770 5,000 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) l.4 
Per-household (kg oil equivalent) 12,266 13,663 
Average annual change 1970-90 (percent) 0 .5 
SOURCES: Per-person energy consumption and growth rate of total energy consumption 
1970-90 estimated by authors from United Nations Development Programme ( 1994): 
Table 25. Total and per-household levels calculated using population and household data 
in Table 3. 
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TABLE 6 Sources of growth of energy consumption, world regions, 1970-90: 
Average annual percent change and, in parentheses, percent shares by world 
regions attributable to population growth or to growth in the number of 
households, and to the combined effect of changes in income and in technology 
I= PAT model 
of which 
Due to 
Growth rate Due to change in 
of energy growth of income per 
consumption population person 
Less developed regions 6.7 2.2 3.0 
(100.0%) (32 .8%) (67.2%) 
More developed regions 2.1 0 .7 2.0 
(100 .0%) (33.3%) (66 .7%) 
I= HAT model 
of which 
Due to Due to 
Growth rate growth of change in 
of energy number of income per 
consumption households household 
Less developed regions 6.7 2 .5 2.7 
(100.0%) (37.3%) (62.7%) 
More developed regions 2.1 1.6 I. I 
(100.0%) (76 .2% ) (23.8%) 
entirely by changes in the level of income is not strictly necessary to make 
the points that follow, but it does simplify matters by reducing the three-
way I= PAT decomposition to a two-way one . If the reader prefers to con-
sider the combined term to be ueconomic growth plus unexplained shifts 
in technology," nothing will be lost in terms of the point we wish to make. 
According to the I= PAT identity, roughly one-third of the growth of 
energy consumption in both less developed and more developed regions 
over this period was accounted for by demographic growth-32 .8 percent 
in the former and 33.3 percent in the latter (Table 6). Shifting to an I = 
HAT framework does not greatly alter the decomposition for less devel-
oped regions, but it completely changes the picture for more developed 
regions. Now, about three-quarters (76.2 percent) of the rate of growth of 
energy consumption is accounted for by demographic increase as measured 
by the rate of growth of the number of households. In Table 7, the same 
decomposition is performed in terms of absolute annual change in energy 
consumption, which allows the increase to be shared among more devel-
oped and less developed regions without worrying about the level of dis-
aggregation at which the decomposition is done (Lutz, Prinz, and Lang-
Due to 
change in 
technology 
1.5 
-0 .6 
Due to 
change in 
technology 
1.5 
-0.6 
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TABLE 7 Sources of growth of energy consumption, world regions, 
1970-90: Average annual absolute change (million tons oil equivalent) 
and, in parentheses, percent shares by world regions attributable to 
population growth or to growth in the number of households and to 
the combined effect of changes in income and in technology 
I=PATmodel 
Growth of Change in income 
population and in technology Total 
Less developed regions 27.2 55.7 82.9 
(15.1 %) (30.9%) (46.0%) 
More developed regions 32.5 64.9 97.4 
(18.0%) (36.0%) (54.0%) 
Total 59.7 120.6 180.3 
(33 . l %) (66.9%) (100.0%) 
I= HAT model 
Growth of 
number of Change in income 
households and in technology Total 
Less developed regions 30.9 52.0 82.9 
(17.2%) (28.8%) (46.0%) 
More developed regions 74.2 23.2 97.4 
(41.1 %) (12 .9%) (54.0%) 
Total 105.1 75 .2 180.3 
(58.3%) (41.7%) (100.0%) 
gassner 1993). The I= PAT identity assigns 18.0 percent of the global an-
nual increase in emissions to demographic growth in more developed re-
gions; the I= HAT identity assigns 41.1 percent. 
Based on such accounting exercises, one could argue that Western 
behavioral patterns, in the form of a tendency toward increasingly nucle-
ated living arrangements, are an important contributor to rising energy con-
sumption. This would be premature, however, as the story is not over. In 
Table 8, we expand the I= HAT decomposition to show the growth of the 
number of households that would have occurred holding age structure con-
stant (that portion which reflects behavioral change) and the growth that 
resulted from shifts in age structure (holding age-specific headship rates 
constant). In the more developed regions, half the contribution of demo-
graphic effects arose from the rate of population growth and half from 
changes in age distribution; behavioral changes in the form of rising age-
specific headship rates were a minor factor. An insight that emerges in the 
I = HAT framework is that the fertility decline which brings about decel-
eration in the rate of overall population growth, relieving pressure on the 
environment, contributes to population aging and the consequent rise in 
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TABLE 8 Sources of growth of energy consumption according to the I= HAT 
model, world regions, 1970-90: Average annual percent change and, in parentheses, 
percent shares by world regions attributable to four sources of that growth 
of which 
Growth rate Due to Due to Due to change 
of energy growth of change in age in age-specific 
consumption population structure headship rates 
Less developed regions 6.7 2 .2 0.4 --0.l 
(100.0%) (32.8%) (6.0%) (-1.5%) 
More developed regions 2.1 0.7 0.7 0.2 
(100.0%) (33.3%) (33 .3%) (9.5%) 
the proportion of the population in age groups characterized by high age-
specific household headship rates, increasing pressure on the environment. 
Fertility decline will, of course, reduce the number of households 20 or 30 
years hence, but in the longer run its impact on the number of households 
is limited by the age-structure change. In short, when environmental im-
pact is considered to be at least in part related to the number of house-
holds as opposed to the number of individuals, and when account is taken 
of how changing age structure affects the number of households, the rela-
tionship between fertility decline and future environmental impacts is less 
straightforward than is commonly assumed. 
Another example: Projected carbon dioxide 
emissions, 1990-2100 
Like the historical decomposition exercise presented above, projections of 
future trends are also dependent on which model is chosen. Table 9 pre-
sents the results of the following illustrative exercise. Four alternative as-
sumptions were made regarding C02 emissions. The first is that these re-
main constant in per-person terms, and the second is that these remain 
constant in per-household terms.' The third is that per-person emissions 
grow 1.0 percent per year in less developed regions and 0.4 percent per 
year in more developed regions. The fourth is that per-household emis-
sions grow 1.0 percent per year in less developed regions and 0.4 percent 
in more developed regions. These four assumed emissions paths were then 
combined with the IIASA population projection and the Central scenario 
household projection presented in Table 2 to calculate global C02 emis-
sions. As shown in Table 9, projections vary widely depending on which 
model is chosen. If the I = PAT model is selected and emissions are as-
sumed to remain constant in per-person terms, an increase of 88 percent is 
projected between 1990 and 2100. If, by contrast, the I = HAT model is 
selected and emissions are assumed to remain constant in per-household 
Due to 
other 
changes 
4.2 
(62 .7%) 
0.5 
(23.8%) 
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TABLE 9 Projected growth of total C02 emissions, world regions, 
under alternative assumptions, 1990-2100 
Average annual 
change (percent) 
Less More Total 
developed developed emissions, 2100 
regions regions (1990 = 100) 
I= PAT model 
Constant per-person emissions 0.9 0.4 188 
Growing per-person emissions 1.9 0.7 399 
l=HATmodel 
Constant per-household emissions 1.4 0.4 267 
Growing per-household emissions 2.4 0.7 624 
NOTE: For assumptions concerning per-person and per-household growth in emissions see text. 
terms, the projected increase is 16 7 percent, almost exactly double. If the I 
=PAT model is selected and emissions are assumed to grow in per-person 
terms, a quadrupling of emissions is projected; if the I = HAT model is se-
lected and emissions are assumed to grow at the same rate, but in per-
household terms, an increase of over sixfold is projected. 
The I= PAT and I= HAT models represent extreme formulations, the 
first assuming no household-level economies of scale whatsoever in the 
activities that generate C02, and the second assuming perfect economies of 
scale. If projections based on demographic trends, as opposed to projec-
tions based on economic trends or even some other "driver," are concep-
tually correct (which is not self-apparent), the truth will presumably lie 
somewhere in-between.8 This would mean that, under the constant emis-
sions assumption, an increase in total emissions of somewhere between 88 
percent and 167 percent would be expected and, under the growing emis-
sions assumption, an increase between four- and sixfold would be expected. 
This substantial range of variation can be narrowed only by research into 
the importance of household-level economies of scale in the activities that 
give rise to co2 emissions. 
Conclusion 
In both more developed and less developed regions, the proportion of the 
population aged under 15 is expected to decline and the proportion of the 
population aged over 60 is expected to rise. Even barring further increases 
in age-specific household headship rates in more developed regions, and 
even without taking into account weakening of the traditional extended 
family in the face of Nmodernization" in the less developed regions, the 
number of households will grow more rapidly than the number of people. 
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Decomposition exercises that seek to impute responsibility for envi-
ronmental impacts such as C02 emissions, as well as forecasts of impacts, 
are sensitive to the demographic unit of account employed. Should this be 
the individuaL the household, the community, or what? Until more is 
known about the nature of the activities that give rise to environmental 
impacts, the answer will not be clear. In the future, it might be possible to 
employ a model such as I= C + aPAT = bHAT, where C is a constant cover-
ing impacts that are not proportional to either demographic units or in-
come (waste from military sources, for example) and a and bare the weights 
attached to impacts that are specific to individuals and households. The kind 
of model chosen should depend entirely on the nature of the specific environ-
mental impact studied and the best information we have about its sources. 
Meanwhile, it would be unwise to draw far-reaching conclusions about 
the impact of demographic variables on the environment from one specific 
choice of model without a substantive justification of that choice. 
Statistical note 
The More Developed Region aggregate consists of Northern America, Japan-Aus-
tralia-New Zealand, West Europe, and East Europe (including the former Soviet 
Union except for the Central Asian republics). The Less Developed Region aggre-
gate consists of all other regions. There is a slight inconsistency between demo-
graphic data from Lutz ( 1994) and the energy and GNP data from United Nations 
Development Programme ( 1994), in that the former classifies the Central Asian 
republics of the former Soviet Union as Less Developed while the latter classifies 
them as More Developed. The discrepancy is too small to affect results significantly. 
Average household size for each of the 12 regions in each of the years 1950, 
1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 was approximated on the basis of incomplete coun-
try-specific household-size estimates taken from the UN Demographic Yearbook for 
1991. For space reasons, the country-level data used to infer regional trends are 
not presented here, but are available from the authors. In some regions, data for 
major countries are unavailable; therefore, the size of the error in regional esti-
mates varies from year to year and from region to region. The data appear suffi-
cient, however, to estimate overall trends fairly accurately, with the important 
exception of China. 
Age-specific household headship rates for each of the 12 regions for around 
1985 were also estimated on the basis of country-specific rates; these data are also 
not presented here but are available from the authors. In this case, the data were 
taken from the 1987 UN Demographic Yearbook. Again, available data are incom-
plete; however, differences between regions are slight, and the regional estimates 
are likely to be fairly accurate. 
Decomposition of household-size changes between 1950 and 1990 was done 
in the following way: in a first step, age- and region-specific household headship 
rates around 1985 (estimated as described above) were assumed to remain con-
stant over time throughout the period 1950-90. Household-size estimates for 1950, 
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1970, and 1980 were calculated by applying the constant rates to changing age 
distributions. Changes over time in these estimates, then, can be assumed to be 
the result purely of changes in the age structure of the population. Effects of changes 
in age-specific household headship rates are calculated as a residual; they are the 
difference between the household-size estimates assuming constant age-specific 
headship rates and the average household size estimated on the basis of data in 
the 1 991 UN Demographic Yearbook. 
Notes 
The authors thank Warren Sanderson and 
Lee Wexler for comments and suggestions. 
l The literature that questions the mas-
sive ceteris paribus assumptions underlying 
I= PAT is scattered, but Shaw (1993), 
Preston ( 1994), and MacKellar and Hor-
lacher ( 1994) are representative. Harrison 
( 1992) exemplifies the sort of application of 
I = PAT that has drawn fire, but it is only 
one of many. 
2 US energy data from the end of the 
1980s give an idea of the significance of such 
effects (Wexler 1995). Not controlling for 
income, households consisting of two per-
sons consume 58.l percent more vehicle fuel 
and 37.6 percent more residential energy 
than households consisting of one person. 
Households consisting of three persons con-
sume 30.4 percent more fuel and 15.l per-
cent more residential energy than households 
consisting of two persons, and economies of 
scale continue to grow as household size in-
creases. Household vehicles and residential 
energy combined account for roughly one-
third of total US energy consumption. 
3 The figures given for China must be 
interpreted with caution. Data on average 
household size were available only for the 
years 1982 and 1984. While they imply a 
decline, mostly as a consequence of declin-
ing fertility, they give no indication of the 
long-term trend since 1950. 
4 The literature on household and fam-
ily demography is vast, and no attempt is 
made here to do it justice. Among the better 
compilations of international data on aver-
age household size from the 1950s to the 
1970s is Kuznets ( 1982). 
5 In the Central scenario, central mor-
tality and fertility assumptions are used; the 
High scenario, which might be termed "slow 
demographic transition," combines high fer-
tility assumptions with high mortality as-
sumptions; the Low scenario, which might 
be termed •rapid demographic transition," 
assumes rapid fertility decline and rapid im-
provements in life expectancy. The assump-
tions and results are discussed in Lutz 
(1994). 
6 Making an explicit assumption on how 
rapidly age-specific headship rates in devel-
oping regions converge on the averages for 
more developed regions would be an obvi-
ous refinement, but it makes little difference 
in results. 
7 Since the rate of growth of population 
and that of households differ, the constant 
per-person and constant per-household sce-
narios implicitly define two different sce-
narios for emissions per unit of GNP, as do 
the two scenarios in which emissions per 
demographic unit are assumed to grow. 
8 Some might argue that demographic 
factors should be suppressed entirely and 
impacts considered solely relative to the level 
of economic activity. But this just raises a 
new set of issues. Should we be looking at 
impact per unit of GNP, impact per unit of 
gross output (including exported goods, the 
impact of whose production should reason-
ably be imputed to someone else's domestic 
absorption; and excluding imported goods, 
the impact of whose production should rea-
sonably be imputed to own-domestic absorp-
tion), impact per unit of domestic absorption 
(in which case impacts arising from imports 
will be weighted averages of impacts per unit 
of production in trading partners), or some-
thing else? Empirical difficulties aside, even 
the conceptual issues are not easily resolved. 
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